Join Us at the 2023 World Economic Conference in Orlando, Florida!

? Dates: November 17, 18, and 19 ? Location: Orlando, Florida, USA (or tune in from home with our virtual ticket options)

Are you ready to unlock the future of economics and finance? Prepare for an unforgettable World Economic Conference experience in sunny Orlando, Florida! This premier event is your gateway to insights, networking, and valuable resources that will supercharge your understanding of the global economy.

?️ What’s Included for In-Person Attendees:

1. Event Admission: Enjoy reserved seating assigned based on the order of ticket sales, ensuring you have a prime view of every presentation.
2. Presentation Slides: Gain access to the presentation slides from all speakers, allowing you to delve deeper into the topics discussed.
3. Video Recording: Can’t make it to a session? No worries! You’ll receive access to video recordings of all conference presentations, so you can catch up at your convenience.
4. WEC Event App: Connect with the conference on a whole new level. Access presentation slides, bonus reports, recordings, and more via the official WEC Event App.
5. Bonus Conference Materials: Get a package of bonus conference-related materials, including exclusive bonus reports and videos (as provided by Martin Armstrong).
6. Morning Information Sessions: Don’t miss out on important morning information sessions, screened on-site in the meeting room on Saturday and Sunday.
7. Networking Opportunities: Exclusive access to the Event App Networking Feature allows you to connect with fellow attendees, both in-person and virtual, fostering valuable professional relationships.
8. Culinary Delights: Savor delicious breakfast and lunch on Saturday and Sunday, prepared to keep you energized throughout the day.
9. Cocktail Reception: Kick off the conference in style at our Friday evening cocktail reception. Meet and mingle with fellow attendees while enjoying refreshing drinks.
10. Swag Bag: As a token of our appreciation, each in-person attendee will receive a swag bag filled with goodies, including an Armstrong Economics notebook, pen, and an event collector’s mug!

Unable to travel? We also have two different ticket options for those wishing to attend virtually! 

Don’t miss this opportunity to be part of a global gathering of economic and financial minds. Secure your spot at the World Economic Conference in Orlando, Florida, and gain the knowledge, connections, and resources you need to thrive in the world of finance and economics.

Space is limited, so act now and reserve your seat! Visit our Events page to register and join us in sunny Orlando this November.

Now available at all major retailers!

The eBook will be available shortly.

The second edition of “The Plot to Seize Russia – The Untold History” is now available for purchase in paperback and hardcover on Amazon and Barnes and Noble. The ebook will be available shortly.

Book description:

“Take care of Russia,” Boris Yeltsin said as he departed his presidency in August 1999. These words were directed at current Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Yeltsin specifically picked Putin as his predecessor to prevent the takeover of Russia.

So, who was Yeltsin warning against? Newly declassified documents from the Clinton Administration prove that there was a plot to rig the Russian election of 2000. These never-before-seen documents confirm numerous attempts to implement pro-Western policies using the Russian oligarchy headed by Boris Berezovsky.

On the other side were the communists who desired a return to the glory days of the Soviet Union. As one of the largest international hedge fund managers, author Martin Armstrong found himself in the middle of perhaps the greatest espionage, or attempt at a regime change for Russia, in modern history.

The Plot to Seize Russia pulls back the curtain to expose the most extraordinary attempt to seize power in modern history, but with the pen rather than armies. These declassified documents reveal a plot that has altered our thinking about the relations between the United States and Russia. The thirst for power comes seething through every line of these papers that alter our perception of reality, change the course of history, and now threaten us with World War III.

Russia is now advising psychological counseling for women who do not intend to have children, which is precisely the type of response governments default to when they refuse to confront economic reality. They search for cultural or emotional explanations when the issue is economical.

Russia’s fertility rate has fallen to roughly 1.4 children per woman, well below the 2.1 replacement level, and total births have declined to near post-Soviet lows at just over 1.2 million annually. This decline has been persistent, not cyclical, and the population is aging rapidly as deaths continue to exceed births. At the same time, the war has removed a significant portion of young men from the population.

The same pattern is unfolding across all developed economies. Europe’s fertility rate is now near 1.3. Spain and Italy are closer to 1.1. Germany is around 1.4. France, once the exception, has fallen sharply and recently recorded more deaths than births for the first time in decades. Japan has been below replacement for years and continues to contract. Even countries that implemented aggressive family subsidies, such as Norway and Hungary, have failed to reverse the trend.

Globally, fertility has collapsed from more than 5 children per woman in the 1960s to just above two today, and the developed world is already well below replacement. The common explanation offered by governments is psychological or social. They speak of changing values, delayed adulthood, or lifestyle preferences. That explanation collapses under scrutiny because it ignores the economic structure that determines behavior.

People do not make long-term commitments, such as having children, without confidence in their financial future. Children represent the largest long-term investment a household can make. When confidence declines, that investment is postponed or abandoned.

At the same time, dual-income households became the norm not by choice but by necessity. A single income no longer supports a family in most developed economies. This fundamentally changes having children because both parents must remain in the workforce to maintain financial stability. Long ago, children helped to secure a family’s financial future, but the opposite rings true today.

Russia’s situation simply reflects these dynamics in a more concentrated form. Economic uncertainty, war, sanctions, and structural inefficiencies amplify the same forces present elsewhere. When surveys show that a large percentage of women do not plan to have children in the near term, that is not a psychological condition. It is a rational response to economic instability amid war. Women in Russia must now face the harsh reality that their husbands will face a compulsory draft, and they will be left raising children alone.

Historically, birth rates rise during periods of expansion and confidence. The post-World War II baby boom occurred because housing was affordable, employment was stable, and future prospects were positive. The economic structure supported family formation. Today, the structure works in the opposite direction. Housing costs, taxation, childcare expenses, and job insecurity create an environment in which the cost of raising children exceeds the perceived benefits. Governments attempt to offset this with subsidies, but those programs do not address the core issue, whixh is the declining return on productive activity relative to cost.

This is why policies focused on incentives have failed. Hungary introduced substantial financial benefits for families. Norway expanded welfare support. France has long provided family subsidies. None of these measures reversed the long-term decline because they do not change the underlying economic equation.

The demographic consequences are significant. A declining birthrate leads to a shrinking workforce, increasing dependency ratios, and pressure on pension systems. Governments respond by raising taxes or increasing borrowing, which further reduces the net income available to working households. This creates a feedback loop that reinforces the decline.

When confidence in the future declines, long-term investments decline. Children are the most fundamental long-term investment in any society. The decline in birth rates is therefore not a social anomaly but a direct reflection of economic confidence. Russia proposing psychological counseling illustrates how far removed policy responses have become from reality. This is not a question of convincing people to want children. It is a question of creating an economic environment where having children is viable.

The Pentagon is now requesting more than $200 billion in additional funding tied to the war with Iran, and the Secretary of Defense stated plainly that “it takes money to kill bad guys.” That statement may sound crude, but it is one of the rare moments where Washington actually tells the truth about war, because war has always been about capital, and the numbers now emerging are already confirming the pattern that has unfolded in every major conflict.

Within the first week alone, the United States spent approximately $11.3 billion, and more comprehensive estimates quickly pushed that figure toward $12.7 billion and beyond, with daily costs running in the range of $500 million or higher. These figures do not include troop deployment, equipment replacement, or reconstruction of depleted stockpiles, which historically account for the majority of total war expenditures, and that is where analysts always underestimate the true cost. The ripple effect of war through the global economy is another topic.

The United States is already operating with a military budget approaching $900 billion to over $960 billion depending on how it is measured under the latest authorization cycles, and that figure alone represents nearly 35% of total global military spending. When a government is already spending at that level before a major conflict escalates, any additional war simply layers on top of an already massive fiscal structure rather than creating a temporary expense.

Another $200 billion is not the cost of the war. That is the opening bid, as first numbers presented to Congress are always understated because they reflect immediate needs. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars followed the same trajectory, beginning with relatively modest projections and ultimately costing trillions.

The data coming out of the current conflict already shows the same dynamic. The Pentagon initially reported costs focused on munitions alone, yet analysts noted that these estimates excluded entire categories of spending, including logistics, personnel, and equipment replacement, which means the actual cost is already far higher than what is being publicly discussed. When high-cost systems such as long-range missiles, interceptor systems, and carrier strike group operations are deployed, the burn rate of capital accelerates dramatically, and those costs compound as the conflict continues.

It often costs millions of dollars to intercept weapons that cost tens of thousands to produce. Interceptors such as Patriot and THAAD systems can cost between $4 million and $12 million per unit, while the drones they are designed to destroy may cost a fraction of that.

Can we afford a war? Janet Yellen once said America could afford perpetual warfare. Yet, the US national debt has now exceeded $39 trillion, rising rapidly with deficits well above $1 trillion annually. War does not occur in isolation from fiscal policy. It accelerates existing trends, particularly the expansion of government debt and the diversion of capital away from productive investment.

From the perspective of the Economic Confidence Model, this is exactly what we expect to see at this stage in the cycle. The 2020.05 turning point marked the beginning of a major shift in confidence, where governments expanded aggressively and fiscal discipline deteriorated. By the time we reached the 2024.35 phase, geopolitical tensions were rising across multiple regions, and capital was increasingly moving toward government as uncertainty in the private sector intensified.

Now moving into the 2026 wave, the model has been pointing to rising instability, and war becomes both a consequence and a driver of that shift. Governments expand military spending as confidence declines domestically, and that expansion further concentrates capital within the public sector. The private sector does not benefit from this in any meaningful long-term way. War spending does create economic activity in the short term, but it does not create sustainable growth. It destroys capital and then requires additional capital to rebuild what has been destroyed. Every missile fired, every aircraft deployed, every ship sent into a conflict zone represents capital consumption, not capital formation.

The request for $200 billion to replenish stockpiles illustrates another reality that is always ignored. War does not end when the shooting stops. The financial obligations continue for years through the replacement of equipment, the expansion of industrial production, and the long-term care of personnel. That is why the true cost of war is always measured over decades, not months.

The FBI has now openly admitted that it is purchasing location data on Americans, confirming what many suspected for years. Director Kash Patel testified that the agency “does purchase commercially available information” and uses “all tools” to carry out its mission, which includes data capable of tracking people’s movements without a warrant.

This is being framed as a legal technicality, but that misses the entire point. The Constitution requires a warrant to obtain this type of information directly from telecom companies, yet by purchasing the same data from private brokers, the government simply bypasses that requirement. Lawmakers have already called this an “outrageous end-run around the Fourth Amendment,” and that is exactly what it is.

What we are witnessing is not new. Governments throughout history always expand surveillance when they begin to lose confidence domestically. The key detail here is not that the FBI is collecting data. It is how the data is being obtained. This information is sourced from the private sector through a multibillion-dollar data broker industry that aggregates location data from everyday phone apps, advertising systems, and digital platforms. The government is not hacking phones. It is simply buying what corporations already collect. That is what creates the legal gray area.

Data has become a commodity. Once something becomes a commodity, it can be bought and sold. Governments, like any other participant, will purchase what they need if the law allows it. The problem is that the law has not kept pace with technology, leaving a gap large enough to drive surveillance through.

This also ties directly into what I have warned about for years regarding financial surveillance. Governments began by monitoring bank accounts, tracking transactions, and implementing reporting requirements under the justification of preventing crime. That expanded steadily. Now we are moving into full behavioral tracking through digital data. The progression is always incremental, never abrupt.

The involvement of artificial intelligence makes this far more significant. Lawmakers have already warned that the ability to analyze “massive amounts of private information” changes the nature of surveillance entirely. It is no longer about targeting individuals. It becomes about pattern recognition across entire populations. That is a very different level of control.

The argument that the data is “commercially available” is also misleading. Just because something can be purchased does not mean it should be used without restriction by the state. The Constitution was designed to limit government power, not to be circumvented by market transactions.

The issue is that the legal framework itself is outdated and being used to justify practices that would have been considered unconstitutional in a previous era. This is how systems evolve. Technology advances, laws lag, and governments exploit the gap. By the time the public recognizes what has happened, the infrastructure is already in place.

From a confidence perspective, this is a warning sign. When governments begin to rely more on surveillance than on economic growth and stability, it reflects a shift away from maintaining confidence through prosperity and toward maintaining control through information.

QUESTION: You said that in the Iraq War, they dragged out Bush to claim victory in just 6 weeks yet it took 8 years to finish. Do you see Trump declaring victory soon as well?

Paul

ANSWER: There is no question that President Donald Trump wants to declare victory ASAP. The problem is that Tehran also gets to vote on that subject and so does Netanyahu. It is true that the US has eliminated  Iran’s navy, and much of its missile stockpile has also been destroyed, along with the assassinations of the Ayatollah and top leaders that was Netanyahu’s objectives. On the surface, it appears that Trump is nearing the goals his military leaders. However, he has not accomplished regime change, which has been Netanyahu’s #1 goal. If Trump attempts to exist, he may find that Netanyahu will take action to drag the US in deeper.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel “acted alone” in attacking an Iranian gas field, as tensions mount over strikes on energy infrastructure across the region. This is my point. We are NOT in full control of this war not matter what verbiage is used to not legally call this a war. Iran has retaliated striking the gas fields of Qatar. Let’s be clear here, while the US and Israel claim they devasted Iran. they are now using the more sophisticated missiles and they have been planning for this for a long time. We publicly said that a second carrier group was being sent and this too was a signal for they to prepare for the end-game war.

QUESTION: Marty, many people know about your forecast of Russia, 1987, 2007 high in real estate, Nikkei, the collapse of communism and so many, but I think even you forgot your forecast that oil would collapse to $10 in 1998 and then swing  up to $100. I remember even Bloomberg covered that forecast that nobody would believe. You have been the master forecaster for you have projected what you call slingshots many times. I asked AI if you made that forecast and it confirmed you made that forecast back in 1998.

Do you still see oil rising to $200 in the years ahead?

Josh

ANSWER: Oh yes, I do remember that. It was Mark Pitman at Bloomberg who was astonished by that forecast. Yes, I still see oil is rising to $200 in the years ahead. Academics will never understand such forecasts. There is no random walk and there certainly is no efficient market nonsense. Markets always overshoot and undershoot the logical expectations.

Wholesale prices rose 0.7% in February, more than double expectations and the largest monthly increase since mid-2025. On a year-over-year basis, PPI is now running at 3.4%, the highest level in roughly a year. This is not a sign that inflation has been defeated. It is a clear indication that price pressures are building again at the wholesale level.

What matters here is that PPI is a leading indicator. These are the costs businesses face before anything reaches the consumer. Manufacturers, transport companies, and wholesalers absorb these increases initially, but they do not simply eat those costs. They pass them along. What we are looking at is the early stage of future consumer inflation already forming in the pipeline.

Goods prices jumped 1.1%, the largest increase since 2023, driven by rising food and energy costs. Food prices alone posted sharp gains, with certain categories like vegetables showing significant spikes. Energy also turned higher again, with gasoline and fuel costs rising. Services inflation continues to push higher as well, rising 0.5% for the month. This marks several consecutive months of firm increases, including sharp moves in areas such as lodging. This is not isolated inflation. It is widespread and embedded throughout the system.

The timing is critical. This report does not yet fully reflect the geopolitical escalation that began at the end of February. Since then, oil prices have surged, and energy costs are already moving higher into March. Energy feeds into everything. Transportation becomes more expensive, production costs increase, and ultimately, the price of food rises as distribution costs climb.

This is how inflation returns in waves. It begins at the wholesale level, then moves into consumer prices. Even mainstream economists are now acknowledging that the inflationary impact from rising energy prices and geopolitical tension will begin to show up more clearly in the coming months. That means this report is likely showing the starting point rather than the peak. This is the environment where stagflation takes shape. Costs rise while growth weakens, and policymakers find themselves unable to respond effectively because the source of inflation is no longer monetary policy but geopolitical events.

From a cyclical perspective, this is exactly what we should expect at this stage. As we move through this period, war and geopolitical instability become dominant forces driving economic outcomes. Energy shocks, supply disruptions, and shifting capital flows create volatility that central banks cannot manage. The mistake governments always make is believing they can fine-tune the economy with interest rates. They cannot control geopolitical events, and they cannot prevent the ripple effects that follow rising energy prices.

What the Bank of England is now proposing are changes to ensure banks can actually use their liquidity during a crisis. For years, regulators claimed the system was safe because banks were holding what they defined as high-quality liquid assets. Now they are effectively admitting those assets may not function when they are needed most.

This comes directly from the lessons of 2023. Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse did not collapse because there was no money in the system. They collapsed because confidence broke and liquidity vanished in real time. Assets that were supposed to be safe could not be sold without losses, and funding disappeared almost overnight.

The Bank of England is now requiring banks to simulate rapid outflows over the course of a single week. That is not a normal recession scenario. That is a bank run. They understand that capital no longer moves slowly. In a digital world, money leaves instantly, and once that process begins, it accelerates. Central banks throughout the world now realize that they are looking at a liquidity crisis.

The mistake policymakers continue to make is believing liquidity is something they can regulate. Liquidity is a function of confidence. Once institutions begin to question counterparty risk, they stop lending. They hoard capital. They shorten the duration. That is when the system freezes, regardless of how much money central banks inject.

At the same time, central banks have been removing liquidity through quantitative tightening. They expanded their balance sheets for over a decade, and now they are reversing that process. This drains reserves from the system and increases stress in funding markets. Even officials have warned there will be disruptions as liquidity is withdrawn. So on one side, they are draining liquidity, and on the other, they are trying to redesign emergency mechanisms to deal with the consequences. That contradiction is the entire story.

Growth in the UK remains weak, inflation is still persistent, and rising energy costs driven by geopolitical tensions continue to pressure the economy. Banks are already reacting by tightening lending and becoming more defensive.

What the Bank of England is really saying, without saying it outright, is that they do not believe the system will function properly under stress. They are attempting to fix a structural flaw that cannot be fixed with regulation. The entire framework assumes markets behave rationally during crises, but history shows the opposite.

Every major financial event follows the same pattern. First, there are quiet warnings like this. Then there are policy adjustments. Then restrictions begin. Finally, when confidence breaks, capital moves and the system shifts very quickly.

This is not about a lack of money. It is about a lack of trust. Once that turns, liquidity disappears regardless of how much central banks try to inject. What we are seeing now is the early stage of that transition, and the Bank of England has just confirmed they know it.

For years, the press has insisted that every conflict must be viewed in isolation: Ukraine is separate from the Middle East, China is separate from Russia, and Iran is simply another regional crisis. But history rarely works that way. When historians look back at major wars, they rarely begin them on the date politicians announce them. World War I did not suddenly begin with a single shot in Sarajevo, and World War II was not simply the invasion of Poland. The causes were decades in the making. The uncomfortable reality is that when historians eventually write about this period, many will likely conclude that what we are witnessing today is the early phases of a world war.

One of the greatest mistakes made after the Cold War was the assumption that the ideological struggle had been permanently resolved. The collapse of the Soviet Union was treated as a final victory rather than the end of a phase. Yet no durable geopolitical framework was created to integrate the defeated power structure into a stable international system. After World War II, the United States and its allies invested enormous resources into rebuilding Europe and Japan through the Marshall Plan and establishing institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods financial order. Those efforts created stability and prevented the reemergence of the same ideological conflict that produced two world wars. After the Cold War, nothing comparable was built.

Instead, Russia and other former Soviet states were left to endure economic collapse, political humiliation, and social chaos during the 1990s. Entire populations watched their national power evaporate while Western institutions expanded eastward. Whether one agrees with the political narratives or not is irrelevant. What matters historically is that unresolved tensions remained. Just as the Treaty of Versailles failed to resolve the deeper contradictions after World War I, the end of the Cold War left grievances that continued to grow beneath the surface.

Now those unresolved tensions are resurfacing simultaneously across multiple regions. Russia is locked in confrontation with the West in Ukraine. China is challenging the global economic and military balance in the Pacific. The Middle East is once again erupting, with Iran increasingly aligned with Russia and China as geopolitical pressure mounts. These are not isolated events. They are overlapping theaters of strategic competition that increasingly resemble the early stages of great-power conflict.

The Economic Confidence Model has long projected that the period around 2026 would mark a geopolitical turning point. That does not mean a sudden global war declared overnight. Historically, major conflicts emerge through a series of regional crises that gradually merge into a broader struggle. The Panic Cycle expected in 2027, and the larger turning point into 2028, suggest rising volatility and confrontation across multiple fronts. What we are seeing today fits that pattern perfectly. If history is any guide, future historians may not mark the beginning of the next world war with a single event. They may instead look back and say the war had already begun during this decade but we simply failed to recognize it at the time.